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OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE:
RELEVANCE REEXAMINED
"It is a fundamental guarantee of American jurisprudence
that a person charged with a criminal offense may safely assume
that he will be tried only for the stated offense, and will not be
required to meet evidence of other, unrelated criminal acts."'
Despite this seemingly clear-cut proposition, a common device
used by the prosecution in criminal cases is the introduction of
the accused's past, concurrent, or subsequent crimes or wrongs
to prove his guilt of the crime charged. 2 The rules regarding the
admissibility of evidence of other crimes have been stated in
various forms. 3 Generally, the law recognizes the propriety of
drawing inferences from happenings other than the one at issue.
The validity of the inference drawn, and thus the admissibility
of the evidence, often turns on the degree of similarity between
the acts sought to be proved and those other acts sought to be
4
introduced.
People v. McDonald5 states the Illinois rule on the admission of other crimes evidence. Generally, evidence of extra-indictment offenses is not admissible against the defendant
except when it tends to prove a fact in issue. "IE Ividence which
goes to show motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake or modus operandi is admissible ....

[IIt has been broadly held that

1. R. DONIGAN, THE EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 9-14 (4th ed. 1980). See also
Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 IowA L. REV. 325 (1956), for
an excellent discussion of the use of other crimes evidence in criminal
prosecutions.
2.

1 C. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §§ 151, 163 (13th ed.

1972).
3. E.g., FED. R. EvID. 404(b). See Rule 404(b) Other Crimes Evidence:
The Needfor A Two-Step Analysis, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 635 (1977) for a discussion of the meaning and application of Rule 404(b). See also 1 S. GARD,
ILLINOIs EVIDENCE MANuAL Rule 4:10 (2d ed. 1979).

Julius Stone has recognized what he terms the "original" and the
"spurious" rules for the admission of other crimes evidence. The former
excludes this evidence (denoted as "similar fact" evidence) when relevant
only to prove a disposition toward criminal conduct, while the latter excludes all such evidence except that which falls within certain exceptions.
Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence. America, 51 HARV.
L. REV. 988, 989 (1938). In his article, Stone traces the origins of the different
forms of the common-law rule from England to the American legal system.

Id. at 991.
4. E. CLEARY & M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 401.14
(3d ed. 1979).
5. 62 IlM.2d 448, 343 N.E.2d 489 (1975). See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 16:371

evidence of other offenses is admissible if relevant for any purpose other than to show propensity to commit a crime. ' 6 An understanding of the concept of relevance is the key to analyzing
this rule and its application. This article will examine the application of this evidentiary rule in Illinois criminal cases, and in
addition, by analyzing the relevance of and the attendant dangers associated with the introduction and admission of other
crimes evidence, will discuss the appropriate scope of the use of
such evidence.
RELEVANCE OF OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE

Evidence introduced at trial must be relevant to be admissible. 7 Evidence is relevant when it tends to show that a fact in
controversy did or did not exist.8 Relevance is often discussed in
terms of probabilities: whether the offered evidence tends to
make a proposition at issue appear more or less probable. 9
Even if evidence is relevant, it is not automatically admitted
and placed before a jury. A court has the power, indeed the obligation, to exclude relevant evidence if the probative value of
such evidence does not outweigh the dangers of prejudice, confusion of issues, or waste of time.1 0 The exclusion of otherwise
relevant evidence is necessary at times to insure the efficiency
of the truth-seeking process. Balancing the desire for truth
against the concern for fairness is within the sound discretion of
the trial judge. No clear standard for this balancing process has
been articulated, but relevant evidence is usually not excluded
unless trial efficiency concerns or prejudice substantially outweigh its probative value.'
Generally, courts are liberal in admitting evidence with
some degree of relevance to matters in issue. Direct and circumstantial evidence are not distinguished in this context.
Either type of evidence is admissible if it is relevant.' 2 One type
of circumstantial evidence, other crimes or acts of the defend6. 62 Ill. 2d at 455, 343 N.E.2d at 492-93.
7. See CLEARY & GRAHAM, supra note 4, at § 402.1; FED. R. EvID. 402.
8. 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 2, at § 151.
9. Id. See also FED. R. EviD. 401, which defines relevant evidence as
that which has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvXD. 401.
10. CLEARY & GRAHAM, supra note 4, at § 402.1; 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 2,
at § 164; FED. R. EviD. 403.
11. CLEARY & GRAHAM, supra note 4, at § 403.1. Some possible trial concerns include avoiding needless cumulation of evidence or the introduction
of irrelevant evidence, and lessening the potential for wasting time and confusing issues.
12. 1 C. TORCL4, supra note 2, at § 155.
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ant, is often sought to be admitted in criminal cases. It may be
argued that evidence of the accused's other crimes or acts, done
either before or after the offense on trial, is relevant to establish
some element of the crime charged. 13 For example, the fact that
A committed a certain act in the past may demonstrate an opportunity or ability to commit a present crime, and may be
probability that A did or did not commit
some evidence of the
14
that present crime.
It is a basic principle of scientific analysis that when one repeats a set of circumstances a number of times and obtains a
similar result in each trial, further repetitions will produce the
same result. It then might be argued that an individual who participates in a course of conduct in the past may be expected to
continue that course of conduct into the future. This very general proposition, however, is not absolute. Concluding that a result occurred because similar results occurred in the past is
dangerous when interjected into legal reasoning because human
behavior is not as predictable as other scientific phenomena.
This potential danger gives rise to the major argument
against admitting evidence of other crimes: the evidence does
not tend to make a fact in issue more probable than not, and it is
therefore not relevant. An accused's conviction ought to be
based on evidence which demonstrates his guilt of the presently
charged offense, and not on evidence of his involvement in other
offenses unrelated to the crime charged.'5 The inherent danger
associated with other crimes evidence is that a jury will infer
that an accused with a criminal history is a "bad man" and that
it may be disposed, therefore, to convict the accused on the basis of his past criminal conduct. Such a conviction would be
based on irrelevant evidence.
A common-law tradition has evolved which prohibits the
prosecution from introducing evidence of a defendant's bad
character as substantive evidence of his guilt. 16 Evidence of
13. DoNIGAN, supra note 1, at § 9-15.
14. 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 2, at § 157.
15. Id. at § 240. See also E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND
FEDERAL EVIDENCE 191 (J. Weinstein 5th ed. 1976).
It is reasonably clear that the probative value of evidence that a person
committed a single crime as tending to prove his disposition to commit
crimes generally is very slight. And although evidence of his commission of a specified crime may have appreciable value in proving a repetition of the offense, it seems equally clear that if other evidence of

disposition in such a case is to be excluded, this circumstantial evidence of disposition should receive similar treatment.

Id.
16. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948). See FED. R.
Evm. 404(a) (codifies the common-law rule). See also CLEARY & GRAHAM,
supra note 4, at § 404.3; S. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
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other crimes is, if admitted, akin to a demonstration of the defendant's bad character. Evidence of other crimes may lead to
the inference that the defendant has a propensity to commit
crimes and, therefore, the introduction of such evidence for this
7
purpose is not proper.'
In Illinois, exceptions which allow for the admission of other
crimes evidence and for its publication to the jury riddle the rule
excluding it. 18 Evidence which falls under one of the exceptions
is deemed relevant to prove an issue in the case. Otherwise relevant evidence may be excluded, however, especially where unfair prejudice to the accused outweighs the probative value of
the evidence. 19 Prejudice may be defined in two ways. It may
mean simply an "increased probability of an unfavorable verdict. ' 20 When used in this manner any evidence which tends to
prove a defendant guilty as charged is prejudicial; 21 an eyewitness account of the crime is highly prejudicial to the defendant
because it increases the likelihood that he will be convicted. Although prejudicial in this sense, the evidence is extremely relevant and must not be excluded. "Prejudice," however, may also
'22
refer to an "increased probability of a verdict contrary to fact.
It is with this type of prejudice that the exclusion of other
crimes evidence is concerned. 23 To avoid the insinuation of this
§ 4:15 (6th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as JONES]; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 190 (2d ed. 1972). Character evidence may be

submitted by the prosecution after a defendant has put his own character in
issue.
17. People v. Lehman, 5 Ill. 2d 337, 342, 125 N.E.2d 506, 509 (1955); People
v. Butler, 63 IM.App. 3d 132, 139, 379 N.E.2d 703, 708 (1978). See also JONES,
supra note 16, at § 4:18.
18. These exceptions include instances in which the other crimes evidence is relevant to prove motive, intent, identity, modus operandi, common scheme, design, or plan, or absence of mistake.
19. 1 S. GARD, supra note 3, at Rule 4:09; 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 305
(Chadbourn rev. 1979).
If the point to prove which the evidence is competent can just as well be
proven by other evidence, or if it is of but slight weight or importance
upon that point, the trial judge might well be justified in excluding it
entirely, because of its prejudicial and dangerous character as to other
points.
MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at § 190 (quoting Adkins v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252,
259, 193 P. 251, 254 (1920)).
20. Comment, Developments in Evidence of Other Crimes, 7 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 535, 543 (1974).
21. People v. Stadtman, 59 Ill. 2d 229, 231, 319 N.E.2d 813, 814 (1974).
22. Comment, Development in Evidence of Other Crimes, 7 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 535, 545 (1974).
23. CLEARY &GRAHAm, supra note 4, at § 403. It is thought that evidence
of other crimes is excluded not because it has no probative value, but because it may have too much-such evidence is apt to be given too much
weight by a jury, resulting in a conviction based on bad character rather
than on specific guilt of the offense charged. People v. Lehman, 5 Ill. 2d 337,
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type of prejudice into a case, the trial judge must balance various factors surrounding the offered evidence in determining its
admissibility. Factors to be considered include the importance
of the evidence to the issues involved in the case, the availability
of other evidence on those issues, whether the issue on which
the evidence is offered is disputed, the potential effectiveness of
limiting or cautionary instructions, and the degree of likely
prejudice. 24 When the trial judge, in the exercise of sound discretion, determines that, when balanced, the value of the other
crimes evidence prevails over the possibility of prejudice to the
defendant, the jury may properly hear the evidence. If probative value does not prevail, the evidence must be excluded to
lessen the danger of a verdict contrary to fact.
The determination of relevancy thus encompasses a twostep approach. First, the inquiry focuses on whether the offered
evidence will make a fact at issue more likely than not to have
occurred. Second, the trial court must determine whether the
evidence, otherwise relevant and admissible, threatens to divert
the attention of the jury from the fact at issue to an improper
consideration of the character of the accused, thus obscuring
any real probative value the evidence might have. The trial
judge should admit such evidence only when, in his discretion,
he finds the situation appropriate. 25 As in any situation where
342, 125 N.E.2d 506, 509 (1955). It is also argued that the defendant's other
crimes constitute collateral issues which may confuse a jury and divert its
attention from the real issues in the case. "A litigant's right to a trial by an
unbiased jury is violated where the jury in fact based its decision on extraCollateral-crimes evidence is likely to violate this
neous matters. ...
right." People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d 129, 143, 402 N.E.2d 238, 245 (1980).
See also 1 S. GARD, supra note 3, at Rule 4:10; JONES, supra note 16, at
§ 4:18; 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 194 (3d ed. 1940). Consider: "[W]hen the
trial court is convinced that its effect would be to generate heat instead of
diffusing light, or... where the minute peg of relevancy will be entirely
obscured by the dirty linen hung upon it. . .," evidence of other crimes
should not be admitted. State v. Goebel, 36 Wash. 2d 367, 378, 218 P.2d 300,

306 (1950).

24. See People v. Foster, 76 Ill. 2d 365, 392 N.E.2d 6 (1979). See also
CLEARY

& GRAHAM, supra note 4, at §§ 403, 404.5.

25. In the interest of fairness to the accused in criminal trials, it has
been suggested that where a judge finds the issue of admissibility to be a
close one, with the balance favoring neither side very convincingly, he
should not admit the evidence.
[The] lee-way of discretion lies rather in the opposite direction, empowering the judge to exclude the other crimes evidence, even when it
has substantial independent relevancy, when in his judgment its probative value for this purpose is outweighed by the danger that it will stir
such passion in the jury as to sweep them beyond a rational consideration of guilt or innocence of the crime on trial. Discretion implies not
only leeway but responsibility.
McCoRMICK, supra note 16, at § 157 (citation omitted). See also People v.
Butler, 31 1ll. App. 3d 78, 80-81, 334 N.E.2d 448, 450-51 (1975).
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discretion plays a major role, the danger of abuse is great unless
extreme caution regarding the admission of this evidence is
exercised.
THE USE OF OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS

The leading Illinois case 26 which defines the circumstances
under which other crimes evidence is admissible is People v. McDonald.27 Before McDonald, Illinois courts had allowed the use
of other crimes evidence, but inconsistencies in the application
of the rules for admission existed. Some cases treated the rule
as generally excluding other crimes evidence, but recognized a
limited number of purposes for which such evidence would be
received. 28 The exceptions were limited to situations in which
such evidence was relevant to place the defendant in time and
place proximity to the charged offense, to aid in establishing the
identity of the perpetrator, or to prove design, motive, or knowledge. 2 9 It was acknowledged, however, that admissibility depended on whether the other crimes evidence was so closely
connected to the main issues in the instant case that it tended to
prove the defendant guilty.30 This statement, although somewhat ambiguous, may be construed as an acknowledgement of
the requirement that the offered evidence be relevant to the issues at hand.
Other decisions revealed a much broader view, however,
and framed the rule as one of allowing admission of other
crimes evidence, unless offered for an improper purpose.3 1 This
approach allowed the admission of relevant evidence of other
crimes for any purpose other than to demonstrate an accused's
propensity to commit%
crimes. 32 For example, such evidence was
26. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
27. 62 IMI.
2d 448, 343 N.E.2d 489 (1975).
28. See People v. Wilson, 46 Ill. 2d 376, 380, 263 N.E.2d 856, 859 (1970)
(evidence of prior sale admissible to show knowledge of possession of narcotics); People v. Tranowski, 20 Ill. 2d 11, 16, 169 N.E.2d 347, 349 (five robberies within one hour and several blocks admissible), cert. denied sub nom.,
Tranowski v. Illinois, 364 U.S. 923 (1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 978 (1962).
But see People v. Spencer, 7 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1021, 288 N.E.2d 612, 615 (1972)
(evidence of bus robbery within four blocks and 17 hours of charged robbery inadmissible).
29. People v. Wilson, 46 Ill. 2d 376, 380, 263 N.E.2d 856, 859 (1970).
30. People v. Tranowski, 20 Ill. 2d 11, 16, 169 N.E.2d 347, 349, cert. denied
sub nom., Tranowski v. Illinois, 364 U.S. 923 (1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 978
(1962).
31. See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
32. People v. Dewey, 42 IMI. 2d 148, 157, 246 N.E.2d 232, 236 (1969) (where
murder defendant claimed that death was accidental, evidence of defendant's offers of rides to four others admissible to show purpose); People v.
Cole, 29 IMI.2d 501, 503-05, 194 N.E.2d 269, 271 (1963) (evidence of defendant's
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admissible to corroborate other evidence already presented or
33
to make a witness' testimony more credible.
The various interpretations of the other crimes evidence
rule and the differences in emphasis on the aspects of the rule
under consideration led to inconsistencies in Illinois decisions.
One court would focus on the exclusionary aspects of the rule in
an effort to minimize prejudice, 34 while another would attempt
to fit the evidence, in a mechanical fashion, into one of the recognized exceptions to the rule. 35 Early cases also reflected differences in the amount of detail of the other crimes or acts which
would be admitted. Testimony showing similar facts might be
admitted if no reference to another completed crime, as such,
were made. 36 In another instance, the court permitted the recounting of a complete, distinct substantive offense to demonstrate peculiar and distinctive features common to both crimes
37
in order to establish the defendant's common scheme.
In McDonald, the Illinois Supreme Court attempted to reconcile these differing views by pronouncing the rule in a new
prior drug sales to witness admissible to rebut claim of innocence and to
explain witness' account of the event and ease in the transaction); People v.
Kovacivich, 10 Ill. App. 3d 797, 799-800, 295 N.E.2d 33, 35-36 (1973) (testimony
of defendant's accomplice concerning other burglaries admissible to show
method).
33. See, e.g., People v. Palmer, 47111. 2d 289, 296, 265 N.E.2d 627, 631 (1970)
(evidence that witness observed defendant committing other crimes admissible to make in-court identification more credible), cert. denied sub nom.,
Palmer v. Illinois, 402 U.S. 931 (1971); People v. Hall, 38 Ill. 2d 308, 315, 231
N.E.2d 416, 420-21 (1967) (armed robbery; evidence of kidnapping on same
night admissible to corroborate defendant's confession, and because the
two crimes were one continuous transaction); People v. Walls, 33 111. 2d 394,
398, 211 N.E.2d 699, 701 (1965) (evidence of auto theft subsequent to charged
rape admissible to corroborate victim's story; aided identification).
34. See, e.g., People v. Gleason, 36 Ill. App. 2d 15, 17, 183 N.E.2d 523, 524
(1962) (evidence in theft case of identical theft three weeks earlier in the
same department of the same store held inadmissible as concerning a distinct substantive offense).
35. See, e.g., People v. Scott, 100 Ill. App. 2d 473, 478-79, 241 N.E.2d 579,
583 (1968) (evidence of a series of burglaries in the same neighborhood excluded when no exception deemed applicable). It is interesting to note that
Scott and Gleason were decided within the same appellate district.
36. See, e.g., People v. Butler, 58 Ill. 2d 45, 49, 317 N.E.2d 35, 37 (1974)
(officer permitted to testify to arresting the defendant without revealing nature of crime); People v. Butler, 31 Ill. App. 3d 78, 80, 334 N.E.2d 448, 450
(1975) (when used to show identity, other crimes evidence should be confined to details showing opportunity for identification and not the details of
other crime); People v. Aughinbaugh, 131 Ill. App. 2d 581, 584, 266 N.E.2d 530,
532 (1970) (witness allowed to testify to having seen defendant with a gun
on the day of the crime charged; not permitted to say that defendant was

robbing another store).
37. People v. Lehman, 5 Il. 2d 337, 125 N.E.2d 506 (1955) (evidence of a
second telephone truck robbery admitted in trial for telephone truck robbery which had occurred two weeks before).
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form. 38 The rule that emerged was a hybrid which embraced
both exclusionary and inclusionary approaches and combined
the best and worst features of the previously promulgated rules.
The practical application of this rule depends a great deal on
subtle distinctions. 39 The court's goal of clarity in this area may
have been frustrated by later misapplications of the rule, in
which apparent misunderstanding of the purposes underlying
the exclusion of other crimes evidence may be observed.
McDonald involved a burglary. The victim was awakened
by a man sitting on her bed trying to choke her. The perpetrator
had gained entrance to the victim's apartment by standing on an
overturned wastebasket and removing a window screen. 4° The
prosecution was permitted to introduce the testimony of another woman who related the details of a similar crime. This
crime occurred four days after the crime in question, and the
defendant had been tried and convicted of the subsequent
crime. 4 1 The court found that the time of commission, the manner of entrance and attack, and the dress of the defendant were
similar enough in the two cases to permit the prosecution to introduce evidence of the other crime to show a similar method or
4 2
modus operandi.
The court found that, in general, evidence of extra-indictment offenses committed by the accused is not admissible. The
court then noted exceptions to this general rule, and held that
evidence which tends to prove a fact in issue-identity, in this
case-is admissible, although it may reveal the accused's participation in other offenses. The court further held that evidence
which "goes to show motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake
or modus operandi" is admissible.4 3 Perhaps to emphasize that
this list of exceptions was not exhaustive, the court reiterated
the prior broad view which held that other crimes evidence is
admissible, if relevant, for any purpose other than to show the
accused's propensity to commit crimes."
After McDonald, confusion continued. Over one hundred
cases decided since McDonald have purported to apply the rule
for the admission of other crimes evidence, but glaring inconsis38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

People v. McDonald, 62 Ill. 2d 448, 455, 343 N.E.2d 489, 492-93 (1975).
See Stone, supra note 3, at 1007.

62 Ill. 2d 448, 450-51, 343 N.E.2d 489, 490 (1975).
Id. at 452, 343 N.E.2d at 491.
Id. at 455, 343 N.E.2d at 493.
Id., 343 N.E.2d at 492.
44. Id., 343 N.E.2d at 493. See also People v. Dewey, 42 Il. 2d 148, 157, 246
N.E.2d 232, 237 (1969); People v. Cole, 29 Ill. 2d 501, 503, 194 N.E.2d 269, 271
(1963).
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tencies persist.45 One explanation is that the ultimate admissi-

bility of other crimes evidence rests on a preliminary, and
discretionary, determination by the trial judge. The judge must
consider the facts and circumstances surrounding each case, the
actual need for such evidence in light of other available evidence, and the danger of unwarranted prejudice 46 as the facts
differ, so must the results. A precise rule is unattainable because the promotion of fairness and justice requires flexibility to
deal adequately with differing factual situations. A rule which
would deny other crimes evidence to the prosecution in all cases
would severely hamper efforts to convict the guilty. Conversely,
a rule which too broadly allows other crimes evidence may result in a multitude of convictions of the currently innocent,
based on an unfortunate past history tending to show bad character. Some compromise must be found.
Cases decided after McDonald, along with commentators on
the law of evidence, continue to try to devise a neat list of exceptional circumstances in which other crimes evidence will be received.47 The most common of these exceptions allow the
prosecutor to use other crimes evidence to show an accused's
state of mind (intent or knowledge), the identity of the perpetrator, a common scheme or design, or the accused's modus operandi. While a specific state of mind is often an element of the
charged offense to be proved by the prosecution, the other exceptions are not ordinarily elements of the crime. 48 The pur45. See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, at § 302. No attempt will
be made here to examine all of the Illinois cases in which the problem has
arisen. Reconciliation of the various decisions is not possible and would be
a frustrating endeavor. What is sought is an examination of some pertinent
cases to illustrate continuing uncertainty in the area. Those cases which
have tried to clarify the rule further or which have offered guidelines for its
application will also be set forth.
46. See, e.g., People v. Olivas, 41 Ill. App. 3d 146, 151, 354 N.E.2d 424, 429
(1976); People v. Butler, 31 Ill. App. 3d 78, 80, 334 N.E.2d 448, 450 (1975). See
also CLEARY & GRAHAM, supra note 4, at §§ 402.1, 404.5; 1 S. GARD, supra
note 3, at Rule 4:09; MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at § 190; 1 C. TORCIA, supra
note 2, at § 151.
47. See, e.g., Cleary &Graham, supra note 4, at § 404.5 (motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or
accident, guilty knowledge, specific intent); 1 S. GARD, supra note 3, at Rule
4:09 (state of mind, motive, intent, habit, pattern or plan) & Rule 4:10 (identity, absence of mistake, motive or intent, presence at scene of crime, common scheme or design).
48. See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, at § 300. Wigmore attempts to differentiate between knowledge or intent (which may be inferred from knowledge) and design, which he defines as a preceding mental
state which may be used to show probable commission. Id. See also Stone,
supra note 3, at 1026 n.190.
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are not
poses for which other crimes evidence is admissible
49
distinct categories of exception and tend to overlap.
Probably the most legitimate use of other crimes evidence is
where the identity of the perpetrator is at issue. Evidence of an
independent crime is admissible to aid in identifying the de50
An
fendant as the one who committed the crime in question.
example of this is a case in which a prior rape and robbery victim was allowed to testify at the trial of a subsequent rape which
had occurred less than one hour later, four blocks away. The
witness was permitted to relate the details of the attack so that
the state could establish that both attacks were done by the
same person. This victim's identification of the defendant bolstered the complaining witness' identification. 5 1 Other cases in
which other crimes evidence was used to aid in identification include those in which the accused committed either a prior or

52
There resubsequent similar offense against the same victim.

mains some uncertainty, however, as to whether all of the details of the other offense should be admissible, or whether the
49. Although listed as a separate exception, a showing of modus operandi may be considered a step from which the identity of the accused as
the perpetrator of the crime may be inferred. The similarities between and
the distinctive features of the various acts may be such that the methods
are closely associated with the defendant. See DONIGAN, supra note 1, at
§ 9-21; 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 2, at § 243. See also People v. Watson, 98 Ill.
App. 3d 296, 298, 424 N.E.2d 329, 331 (1981) (modus operandi is nothing more
than circumstantial evidence of identity); People v. Sievers, 56 Ill. App. 3d
880, 883, 372 N.E.2d 705, 707 (1978) (other rapes admitted to show design and
identity).
Courts also tend to view similarities between other crimes and the
present crime as evidencing modus operandi and a common scheme. See,
e.g., People v. Gonzales, 60 Ill. App. 3d 980, 377 N.E.2d 91 (1978) (similarities
of attacks make other crimes evidence relevant to show common scheme
and modus operandi);People v. Middleton, 38 Ill. App. 3d 984, 350 N.E.2d 223
(1976) (peculiar and distinctive features show modus operandi and constitute common scheme).
Text writers also indicate that a showing of common design may be
helpful to show absence of mistake, to negate innocent intent, or to infer
knowledge. See DONIGAN, supra note 1, at § 9-18; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note
19, at § 304. Some writers attempt to separate each of the recognized exceptions into discreet, exclusive categories. Wigmore claims that other crimes
evidence has been used to show a plan even in cases where the act in question has not yet been established. He would require more than a mere
showing of similarity between acts to demonstrate a design. 2 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 19, at § 304. In contrast, when intent is the object to be proved,
the act is assumed to be done and a showing of similar gross features may
be sufficient for this purpose. Id.
50. See, e.g., People v. Cruz, 38 Ill. App. 3d 21, 30, 347 N.E.2d 227, 234
(1976). See also 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 2, at § 243.
51. People v. Oliver, 50 Ill. App. 3d 665, 675, 365 N.E.2d 618, 626 (1977).
52. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 91 Ill. App. 3d 112, 414 N.E.2d 755 (1981)

(evidence of subsequent robbery of same place three months later admissi-

ble to show identity); In re Hatfield, 72 Ill. App. 3d 249, 390 N.E.2d 453 (1979)
(prior robberies of same victim admissible).
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evidence should be limited to only those details which show the
53
opportunity for identification.
Another significant exception to the general rule of exclusion is the admission of evidence which tends to prove intent or
another mental state which is an element of the crime charged.
Wigmore suggests that the theory of using other crimes evidence to prove intent is that it illustrates a recurrence of similar
results which tend to negative an innocent mental state.5 4 To
use other crimes evidence in this way, the other crimes must be
so closely related in time or circumstances to the charged crime
that they constitute a continuous transaction.5 5 Illinois courts
have commonly admitted other crimes evidence to show intent
or mental state in drug-related cases. Evidence of a previous
drug sale to an undercover policeman was admitted as tending
to show the defendant's intent in a later transaction where he
claimed to be an innocent bystander. 56 In another case, evidence of a defendant's statements on another occasion, regarding his ability to procure drugs at specified prices, was deemed
relevant to show a present state of mind in the charged offense. 57 Evidence of other crimes, used to show a particular
mental state, is also relevant and admissible in other types of
cases; evidence of a burglary and the theft of a knife was relevant to support the defendant's intent to attempt murder.58
Also, evidence of a previous conviction for attempted rape was
deemed probative of the defendant's mental state, and was admitted to show that a rape victim did not consent, as the defendant had claimed.5 9
Cases in which other crimes evidence was admitted to show
a particular modus operandi or to show a common scheme are
53. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 91 Ill. App. 3d 112, 116, 414 N.E.2d 755, 759
(1981) (Van Deusen, J., specially concurring); In re Hatfield, 72 Ill. App. 3d

249, 259, 390 N.E.2d 453, 460 (1979) (acknowledging that perhaps the evidence should be limited to the fact that the victim had seen the defendant
before).
54. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, at § 302. This concept is seen as a logi-

cal process which negates innocent intent by multiplying instances of the
same result until it is perceived that innocence cannot account for all of

them: "[A]n unusual and abnormal element might perhaps be present in

one instance, but ...

the oftener similar instances occur with similar re-

sults, the less likely is the abnormal element to be the true explanation of

them." Id.
55. See

DONIGAN, supra note 1, at § 9-17; 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 2, at
§§ 168, 245.
56. People v. Jaffe, 64 Ill.
App. 3d 831, 381 N.E.2d 1018 (1978).

57. People v. Hill, 56 Ill. App. 3d 510, 371 N.E.2d 1257 (1978). The dissent
viewed the evidence as establishing nothing other than a propensity on the
defendant's part to commit crime. Id. at 515-16, 371 N.E.2d at 1261 (Craven,
J., dissenting).
58. People v. Brooks, 50 Ill. App. 3d 4, 364 N.E.2d 994 (1977).
59. People v. Lighthart, 62 Ill. App. 3d 720, 379 N.E.2d 403 (1978).
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also varied in terms of factual situations and the standards of
admissibility which the trial judges apply. When courts hold
other crimes evidence admissible to show modus operandi,they
usually compare the details of each offense and then state the
significant similarities which justify admission. 60 Conversely, if
the court holds the evidence inadmissible, the usual rationale is
61
a lack of similarity in details.
One court required that, to establish a modus operandi, the
other crimes evidence had to show a clear connection to the offense charged so that the inference of the perpetrator's identity
flowed logically; common factors alone were not sufficient to
support such an inference. 62 Another standard for a distinguishable modus operandi requires that the charged offense and the
other offense must exhibit "peculiar and distinctive features" so
63
as to "earmark the crimes as the handiwork of the accused."
The Illinois Supreme Court has recently held that a "striking
similarity" between the crimes must be established. 64 The danger in these variations is that trial courts faced with other
crimes evidence might pick and choose the standard they wish
to apply in order to reach the desired result in a given case.
Some courts have recognized the potential for misapplication of the other crimes evidence rule and warn against a
mechanical application. Courts have stated that a declaration
that a case falls within an exception to the rule should not be an
60. See, e.g., People v. Watson, 98 Ill. App. 3d 296, 424 N.E.2d 329 (1981)
(similarity of rapist's conduct admitted to show modus operandi and to es-

tablish identity); People v. Johnson, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 423 N.E.2d 1206

(1981) (evidence of another rape within eight days and four blocks suffi-

ciently similar to show common scheme or design), cert. denied sub nom.,
Johnson v. Illinois, 455 U.S. 952 (1982); People v. DiGiacomo, 71111. App. 3d
56, 388 N.E.2d 1281 (1979) (evidence of similar rape on night of charged rape
showed identical modus operandi and was admissible); People v. Moore, 61

Ill. App. 3d 694, 378 N.E.2d 516 (1978) (similar rape and robbery several days
prior to charged offense admissible); People v. Marine, 48 InI. App. 3d 271,
362 N.E.2d 454 (1977) (similar manner of entry in other burglary was relevant to establish modus operandi).
61. See, e.g., People v. Triplett, 99 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1083, 425 N.E.2d 1236,
1241 (1981) (similarities common to robberies in general; inadmissible);
People v. Cook, 53 Ill. App. 3d 997, 998, 369 N.E.2d 246, 247 (1977) (admission
of other rape for which defendant was convicted held effective to inflame
jury and not relevant to show modus operandi;vague similarities common
to many rapes).
62. People v. Butler, 63 Ill. App. 3d 132, 140, 379 N.E.2d 703, 708 (1978)
(similarities of location and victims not sufficient to infer identity).
63. People v. Therriault, 42 Il. App. 3d 876, 886, 356 N.E.2d 999, 1007
(1976) (similarities in two rapes within one month and five blocks showed
common modus operandi).
64. People v. Tate, 87 Ill. 2d 134, 141, 429 N.E.2d 470, 475 (1981).
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automatic determination in favor of admissibility. 65 "Othercrimes evidence cannot be admitted if the grounds for establishing its relevance are speculative. ' 66 Evidence of other crimes
67
must have substantial relevance to prove an issue in the case.
The goal of proving time and place proximity, without more, is
68
an insufficient justification for admitting this evidence.
McCormick recognized the problem which arises when
courts mechanically apply the rule and the exceptions:
There is danger that if judges, trial and appellate, content themselves with merely determining whether the particular evidence of
other crimes does or does not fit in one of the approved classes,
they may lose sight of the underlying policy of protecting the accused against unfair prejudice. The6 9policy may evaporate through
the interstices of the classification.
At least one Illinois court has also seen the dangers inherent in
this mechanical approach. In People v. Triplett,70 the court
pointed out that other crimes evidence may fall into several categories, or none at all, and the problem is one of balancing and
not "pigeon-holing". The court felt that the standards of rele71
vance should be applied strictly to insure fairness.
At the other extreme, some courts take advantage of the approach which allows other crimes evidence to be admitted for
any relevant purpose other than to show a propensity to commit
crimes. Evidence of the accused's other crimes has been admitted to explain the relative ease with which a government agent
was able to purchase drugs from the accused, 7 2 to contradict an
65. See, e.g., People v. Pelate, 49 Ill.
App. 3d 11, 363 N.E.2d 860 (1977)

(judge must considertactual need for the evidence); People v. Olivas, 41 Ill.
App. 3d 146, 151, 354 N.E.2d 424, 429 (1976) (fact that evidence falls into ex-

ception does not guarantee admissibility; court must balance probative
value against prejudicial effect).
66. People v. Lindgren, 79 111.
2d 129, 140, 402 N.E.2d 238, 244 (1980) (distinct crime committed for different reason at different place and time not
sufficiently relevant).
67. People v. Johnson, 81 Ill.
App. 3d 359, 360, 401 N.E.2d 288, 289 (1980)
(evidence sufficient to establish identity without other crimes evidence).
68. See, e.g., People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill.
2d 129, 139, 402 N.E.2d 238, 243
(1980); People v. Carlson, 98 Ill.
App. 3d 873, 876, 424 N.E.2d 968, 971 (1981)
(inquiry into defendant's activities at a specific place does not establish witness' knowledge of defendant's presence); People v. Watson, 55 Ill.
App. 3d
564, 568, 371 N.E.2d 113, 116 (1977) (evidence fits into no exception; that defendant was in the same place two months later lacks probative value). See
generally CLEARY &GRAHAM, supra note 4, at § 404.5.
69. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at § 190.
70. 99 Ill.
App. 3d 1077, 425 N.E.2d 1236 (1981).

71. Id. at 1082-83, 425 N.E.2d at 1240.
72. People v. Borawski, 61 IM. App. 3d 774, 378 N.E.2d 255 (1978)
(narcotics).
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alibi defense by placing the defendants at a different location,7 3
to show a lack of consent on the part of a rape victim, 74 and to

show that the defendant was engaged in a vendetta against the
victim. 75 Other crimes evidence has also been used to explain a

cashier's reason for detaining the defendant at a bank,7 6 to show
the circumstances of the defendant's arrest and that the weapon
used there was stolen during the commission of the charged offense, 77 and to establish the authority of an officer to make an
arrest.

78

In some cases, the prosecution attempts to justify using
other crimes evidence by claiming that this evidence tends to
enhance the credibility of state witnesses and to corroborate
other evidence in the case. 79 Some courts, however, have been
reluctant to accept this view, and have held that this evidence
may not be used for the independent purpose of enhancing the
credibility of state witnesses. 80 This proposition seems to recognize that the accumulation of inflammatory evidence of other
crimes poses a great danger of overpersuasion of the jury and of
81
prejudice to the accused.
73. People v. Bolton, 35 Ill.
App. 3d 965, 343 N.E.2d 190 (1976) (robbery
and shooting one day later used as evidence in murder trial).
74. People v. Dorn, 46 Ill. App. 3d 820, 361 N.E.2d 353 (1977) (evidence
showed concurrent robbery of rape victim).
75. People v. Godsey, 57 Ill.
App. 3d 364, 373 N.E.2d 95 (series of arsons
all aimed at one victim), rev'd on other grounds, 74 Ill.
2d 64, 383 N.E.2d 988
(1978).
76. People v. Hatcher, 45 Ill. App. 3d 374, 359 N.E.2d 1157 (1977) (defendant arrested at bank twenty days after robbery while trying to cash victim's
checks).
77. People v. Diaz, 78 Ill.
App. 3d 277, 397 N.E.2d 148 (1979) (admission
was error, as all details of subsequent, unrelated attempted armed robbery
were not relevant).
78. People v. Hoppock, 98 Ill.
App. 3d 58, 423 N.E.2d 1351 (1981) (evidence leading up to charge of resisting arrest admissible).
79. See, e.g., People v. Romero, 66 Il. 2d 325, 329, 362 N.E.2d 288, 289
(1977) (events subsequent to charged burglary not relevant); People v. Sutton, 45 Ill. App. 3d 739, 741, 359 N.E.2d 1132, 1133 (1977) (accomplice testimony more credible with evidence of other crimes committed by the
accomplice and the defendant).
80. See, e.g., People v. Romero, 66 Ill.
2d 325, 362 N.E.2d 288 (1977); People v. Mangiaracina, 98 Ill. App. 3d 606, 609, 424 N.E.2d 860, 863 (1981) (other
incidents involving victim and defendant not relevant to show defendant's
intent); People v. Turner, 78 M1.App. 3d 82, 94-95, 396 N.E.2d 1139, 1148 (1979)
(evidence of prior burglaries of victim and subsequent kidnapping of witness improperly admitted in murder case).
81. See, e.g., People v. Olson, 96 Ill. App. 3d 193, 198-99, 420 N.E.2d 1161,
1165 (1981) (admission of evidence of burglary conviction and parole in trial
for attempted murder and armed violence demonstrated trial court's insensitivity to need for balancing and overpersuaded jury); People v. Funches,
59 Ill. App. 3d 71, 73, 375 N.E.2d 135, 137 (1978) (introduction of evidence of
seven other thefts at trial for one theft was "prosecutorial overkill").
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Even though both the inclusionary and exclusionary forms
of the other crimes evidence rule prohibit the admission of such
evidence for the purpose of showing a propensity to commit
crimes, there is one area, cases involving sex offenses, 82 in
which courts are inclined to admit this evidence apparently for
just that purpose. Theoretically, prior acts may show a relationship between the parties and may show that the act in question
was more likely than not to have occurred. 83 In this area, a general disposition toward committing sex crimes is viewed as relevant to prove the sex crime at issue. This particular distinction
is devoid of logical explanation. Why is proof of a propensity to
commit sex-related crimes acceptable in view of the general restriction against evidence of "bad character"? The dangers of
prejudice, and of a conviction not grounded in the facts of the
case at bar, appear even greater in light of the inflammatory nature of sex-related offenses. Nevertheless the practice continues, and the trend appears to be toward expanding, rather than
restricting, the use of other crimes evidence in sex offense
prosecutions.
PROOF OF OTHER CRIMES: THE EFFECT OF AcQuITTAL

In many instances, evidence of an accused's other crimes is
relevant to prove elements of the crime at issue. It is therefore
necessary to establish some standard of proof regarding the accused's commission of the other offense: what amount of proof
is necessary before the judge can determine that the other
crimes evidence is admissible in the case on trial? This question
is especially significant whenever the evidence involves an offense for which the defendant has been acquitted.
Most authorities recognize that proof of the commission of the other
crime need not be beyond a reasonable doubt, and it has been
suggested that each item of evidence need only meet the test of
relevancy.8 4 The burden imposed on the government depends
82. See DONIGAN, supra note 1, at § 9-22; MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at
§ 190; MORGAN, supra note 15, at 192; 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 2, at § 250. See
also Slough & Knightly, supra note 1, at 333.
83. CLEARY & GRAHAM, supra note 4, at § 404.5.
84. See, e.g., People v. Fletcher, 59 111. App. 3d 310, 375 N.E.2d 1333 (1978)
(kidnapping, murder); People v. Parker, 35 Ill.
App. 3d 870, 343 N.E.2d 52
(1976) (burglary); People v. Everett, 14 Ill. App. 3d 421, 302 N.E.2d 723 (1973)
(forgery); People v. Clark, 104 Ill. App. 2d 12, 244 N.E.2d 842 (1969) (forgery).
See also 1 S. GARD, supra note 3, at Rule 4:10; 1 C. TORCIA, supra note 2, at
§ 263; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 19, at § 307. But see People v. McRae, 47 Ill.
App. 3d 302, 311, 361 N.E.2d 685, 691 (1977) ("proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of all elements of the other crimes is not indispensible as a prerequisite to the competency of the evidence as tending to establish motive").
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on the esteem accorded the rights involved 85-here, the right of
an accused to be free from having to defend against crimes with
which he is not presently charged. 86 No one standard of admissibility of other crimes evidence has emerged from the Illinois
decisions and the stated burdens vary widely.
Some courts appear satisfied when a "great deal" of evidence connects the defendant to the other crimes. 87 Others
would require, as a prerequisite to admission, that it be shown
that the other crime took place and that the defendant participated therein. 88 The absence of a clear standard for the admission of other crimes evidence raises substantial concerns for
fairness and greatly increases the possibility of prejudicial evidence reaching a jury. This threat expands when the evidence
sought to be introduced involves offenses for which there has
been a previous acquittal. Some courts outside of Illinois have
concluded that such evidence should be completely excluded
due to the fact that an acquittal greatly reduces the weight that
can properly be given to the other crimes evidence. 89 Illinois
courts disagree as to whether an acquittal of another offense
bars admission of evidence of that offense in a subsequent
trial, 90 and some have held that a prior acquittal does not affect
the admissibility of other crimes evidence. 9 1
85. See

MORGAN,

supra note 15, at 21-22.

86. See People v. Sanders, 59 Ill. App. 3d 650, 375 N.E.2d 921 (1978) (evidence of unrelated and uncharged burglary and theft not relevant to rape
charge).
87. See, e.g., People v. Fletcher, 59 Ill. App. 3d 310, 320, 375 N.E.2d 1333,
1339 (1978). See also Annot., 3 A.L.R. 784, 785 (1919); MCCORMICK, supra

note 16, at § 190.
88. See, e.g., People v. Walters, 69 Ill. App. 3d 906, 917, 387 N.E.2d 1230,

1238 (1979) (murder and attempted armed robbery); People v. Miller, 55 Ill.
App. 3d 421, 426, 370 N.E.2d 1155, 1159 (1977) (mere suspicion of other arson
insufficient). See also CLEARY & GRAHAM, supra note 4, at § 404.5.

It has also been suggested that unless a jury would have been authorized to find the defendant guilty of the other offense had it been tried, evidence of the other offense should never be admitted. See Annot., 3 A.L.R.
784, 785 (1919).
89. See 2 J.

WIGMORE,

supra note 19, at § 306 n.4; Annot., 86 A.L.R. 2d

1132, 1146 (1962) (acquittal supports inadmissibility because of showing propensity or bad character).
90. See generally Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 1132 (1962), which states that the

numerical weight of authority is that acquittal does not render the other
crimes evidence inadmissible, although most courts will allow the defendant to prove the acquittal. Id. at 1135. It has been suggested, however, that
the defendant's "acquittal of an offense should relieve him from having to
answer again, at the price of conviction for that offense or another, evidence
which amounts to a charge of a crime of which he has been acquitted." Id.
at 1136 (quoting State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 350 P.2d 756 (1960)).

91. See, e.g., People v. Osborne, 5311. App. 3d 312, 323, 368 N.E.2d 608, 617
(1977) (prior acquittal does not require estoppel or res judicata), cert. de-
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Several Illinois decisions have stressed the policy of fairness and the responsibility for balancing probative value against
prejudicial effect when considering evidence of an offense for
which there has been an acquittal, suggesting that an acquittal
of a prior crime renders admission of evidence of that crime
much less desirable. 92 It may be preferable to admit only those
facts which bear directly on the issues at hand, and not to reveal
the actual commission of another crime. 93 The prosecutor may
show that the defendant was observed doing specified acts
which constitute the crime of burglary, but without actually
naming the other crime as burglary. This distinction is necessary, especially where there has been an acquittal, because the
unfavorable impression that other crimes evidence leaves with a
jury can never be completely erased.94 Despite this notion, however, complete evidence of other crimes has been held admissible, even where an acquittal has been obtained.9 5
This attitude concerning the admission of other crimes for
which there has been an acquittal flies in the face of all consideration of reason or fairness. It may even constitute a step toward dealing a fatal blow to one of the oldest and most basic
presumptions in criminal law-that one is presumed innocent
until proven guilty. The use of this evidence may also raise significant double jeopardy concerns. An acquittal does not necessarily determine facts, any more than does a conviction, but it is
from the totality of the circumstances that a conclusion is
drawn. A conviction, however, is recognized as conclusive proof
that the defendant was guilty of the crime in question, as evidenced by the imposition of punishment. Anything less than a
conviction ought to signify, logically, that the defendant was not
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
It may be said that an acquittal does not necessarily prove
innocence; even though acquitted, a defendant might have been
guilty of the crime. He may have escaped conviction because of
any number of factors other than his innocence. But, neither is
acquittal proof of guilt. Litigation must come to an end at some
nied sub nom., Osborne v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 837 (1978); People v. Bricker, 48
Ill. App. 3d 452, 455, 363 N.E.2d 190, 192 (1977) (no estoppel).
92. See People v. Ulrich, 30 Ill. 2d 94, 101, 195 N.E.2d 180, 183-84 (1963)

(fairness requires the present charge to stand or fall on its own facts); People v. Butler, 31 Ill. App. 3d 78, 81 n.2, 334 N.E.2d 448, 451 n.2 (1975) (acquittal
must bear on judge's determination of whether the evidence is convincing

that the defendant committed the other crime).
93. People v. Pendleton, 52 Ill. App. 3d 241, 249, 367 N.E.2d 196, 202 (1977)
(tailor evidence strictly where defendant acquitted of other crime), cert. denied sub nom., Illinois v. Pendleton, 435 U.S. 956 (1978).
94. See Annot., 86 A.L.R. 2d 1132, 1136, 1146 (1962).

95. People v. Everett, 14 Ill. App. 3d 421,426-27, 302 N.E.2d 723, 728 (1973).
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point. An acquittal ought to relieve a person from having to defend against the same allegations of criminal conduct ever
again.9 6 If the admissibility of other crimes evidence must turn
on its relevance to present issues, as well as on some proof of
the defendant's connection to the other crime, 97 admission of evidence of prior offenses implies that, because charges were
brought, the defendant was guilty, even though acquitted. Extreme caution must be exercised where offered evidence relates
to an acquitted offense so as to avoid such a prejudicial implication. A prior acquittal may indeed be conclusive proof of a defendant's innocence, and he should not be required to meet the
evidence of the other crime once again on a different
battlefield. 98
LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS TO MINIMIZE PREJUDICE

It is certain that evidence of other crimes by the accused
will be admitted in criminal cases. If this evidence is admitted
for limited purposes, and not for the broad purpose of proving
criminal propensity, it is incumbent on the trial judge to instruct
the jury properly on this limited use.9 9 This is consistent with
the theory that the use of limiting instructions is effective in
minimizing any possible prejudice accompanying the other
crimes evidence. 10 0
One example of such a limiting instruction is the Illinois
Pattern Jury Instruction 3.14. The instruction reads:
3.14 Proof of Other Crimes-Intent, etc.
Evidence has been received that the defendant has been involved in [offenses] [an offense] other than that charged in the indictment [information]. This evidence has been received solely on
the issue of the defendant's [identification-presence-intent-mo96. Indeed, the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969), would seem to guarantee this relief to a criminal defendant. See U.S. CONST amend. V.

97. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
98. Consider this convoluted reasoning:
[A] n acquittal ... for uttering a forged check, would not necessarily
negative the fact that the check was forged, if in fact it was forged;...

All these facts may have been found to be true, and yet the party may
have been acquitted ....
The verdict of acquittal may have resulted
from the fact that the jury could not, upon the evidence before them,
find all the facts, which must exist and be proved, in order to constitute
the crime. ...
Bell v. State, 57 Md. 108, 116-17 (1881). It is possible that although the check

in Bell may have been forged, as the court states, it is by no means clear
that the defendant must forever be expected to answer for having done the
forgery.
99. See 1 C. TORCLA, supra note 2, at §§ 161, 264.
100. See, e.g., People v. Cole, 29 Ill. 2d 501, 505, 194 N.E.2d 269, 272 (1963).
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tive-design-knowledge]. This evidence is to be considered by
you only for the limited purpose for which it was received. 01'
Two problems are readily apparent with the use of such an
instruction at the close of a trial. First, once a jury is permitted
to hear evidence which is highly inflammatory and which may
actually have been introduced for the purpose of creating
prejudice in favor of the prosecution, the damage is done. 0 2 No
amount of instruction to disregard such evidence, or to consider
it for a limited purpose, can guarantee that its prejudicial effect
10 3
will be eliminated from the minds of the jurors.
Second, the possible prejudice that may have been created
at the time of admission may be reinforced if the judge, by giving such an instruction prior to deliberations, reminds the jury
that such information was received. A juror may not have given
much weight to the evidence of other offenses when he first
learned of it. He may, however, be inclined to remember it and
to give it even more weight, all out of proportion to its probative
value, if such evidence is the subject of a specific charge from
the judge.
A better approach would involve an instruction to the jury
prior to the admission of the evidence which addresses the issue
of limited purpose. In this way, the jury could be informed of
the reasons for hearing such evidence just prior to its admission
and could then judge the weight to be given it at that time. This
approach is preferable to hearing, long after the fact, a limiting
instruction which might go unnoticed among other instructions,
or, conversely, which might be singled out and accorded significance beyond its worth.
CONCLUSION

Other crimes evidence is here to stay. Regardless of
whether a court uses an inclusionary or exclusionary approach,
this evidence will, arguably, be relevant to prove widely varying
issues in scores of criminal cases. It is obvious that, in Illinois,
the restrictions on the use of other crimes evidence are as varied
as the factual situations in which the evidence is introduced.
The admissibility of other crimes evidence must be limited.
There exists a tremendous potential for verdicts which result
not from facts proving an accused's guilt, but rather from the
inference that the accused is an evil person who ought to be
101. I.P.I. 2d 3.14 Criminal (1981).
102. People v. Gregory, 22 Ill. 2d 601, 605, 177 N.E.2d 120, 123 (1961)
(murder).
103. People v. Brown, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1025, 279 N.E.2d 765, 767 (1972)
(murder).
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punished. As the Illinois Supreme Court has said, it is "elementary that a defendant, no matter how reprehensible his crime or
how black his history of misdeeds, is entitled to have his guilt or
innocence determined solely with reference to the crime with
which he is charged."'10 4 It must be recognized, therefore, that
the admission of other crimes evidence must be carefully scrutinized, if not greatly curtailed, in order to render such a proposition meaningful.
A recommended procedure for the admission of other
crimes evidence involves several steps. First, the trial judge,
outside the presence of the jury, would hear a summation of the
prospective testimony prior to a witness taking the stand. The
judge would then instruct the prosecution concerning what facts
may and may not be elicited before the jury.10 5 This would prevent accumulation of inflammatory evidence when the need for
the evidence does not really exist and would also protect against
the jury knowing of the defendant's involvement in a distinct,
unrelated offense, the nature of which may be irrelevant to the
case at hand.
Second, the judge must determine that the evidence is relevant, probative, and absolutely necessary in light of the circumstances, and should not apply mechanically a list of exceptions
to see if the evidence fits into one of them. Third, the judge
might be required to set forth the reasons for his determination
as further protection against arbitrary action. Finally, the judge
would instruct the jury, before he allows it to hear the evidence,
of the limited purpose for which it is admitted. If all of these
steps are taken, the interests of justice and fairness will be better served.
If the evidence offered is of other crimes for which the defendant has been acquitted, special protections and closer scrutiny are required to guard against undue prejudice. The best
approach would be to exclude such evidence completely to
avoid an inference of guilt in the other crime or in the one at bar,
without an adequate basis in fact. Where such evidence is
deemed substantially probative, minimally prejudicial, and absolutely necessary, the evidence admitted should be strictly
tailored. Only that amount of detail for which there has been
clear proof, and which is actually-not just arguably-relevant
to current issues may be admitted. Above all, any uncertainty
should be decided in the defendant's favor and against admis2d 601, 603, 177 N.E.2d 120, 122 (1961).
104. People v. Gregory, 22 Ill.
App. 3d 241,250, 367 N.E.2d 196, 203 (1977).
105. People v. Pendleton, 52 Ill.
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sion. Other crimes evidence should never be admitted if any
doubt as to its value exists.
Ruth Miller

